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Abstract. We present a logic for reasoning about the interplay between
belief, evidence and trust in a multi-agent setting. We call this logic DL-
BET which stands for “Dynamic Logic of Belief, Evidence and Trust”.
According to DL-BET, if the amount of evidence in support a given
fact ϕ and the ratio of evidence in support of ϕ to the total amount of
evidence in support of either ϕ or its negation are sufficient then, as a
consequence, one should be willing to believe ϕ. We provide a sound and
complete axiomatization for the logic and illustrate its expressive power
with the aid of a concrete example.
1 Introduction
As emphasized by the philosopher A.J. Ayer, the connection between evidence
and belief is an essential aspect of human rationality:
“...A rational man is one who makes a proper use of reason: and this
implies, among other things, that he correctly estimates the strength of
evidence” [3, p. 3].
The connection between belief and evidence is also relevant for artificial intelli-
gence (AI) and, in particular, for reasoning under uncertainty [32] and informa-
tion fusion [17]. For instance, information fusion can be conceived as an aggre-
gation process which aims to extract truthful knowledge from incomplete or 
uncertain information coming from various sources of evidence.
The aim of the present paper is to provide a logic of the interplay between 
evidence and trust, on the one hand, and between evidence and belief, on the 
other hand. We call this logic DL-BET which stands for “Dynamic Logic of 
Belief, Evidence and Trust”. Specifically, DL-BET supports reasoning about an 
agent’s belief formation and belief change due to evidence provided by reliable 
information sources.
The central idea of DL-BET is that an agent accumulates evidence in support 
of a given fact ϕ from other agents in the society and the body of evidence in 
support of ϕ can become a reason to believe ϕ. Trust is a necessary condition for 
an agent to accept the information provided by another agent and to integrate 
it as a new piece of evidence in support of a given fact.
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A central assumption of the logic DL-BET is that, to form a belief that a
certain fact ϕ is true, an agent is sensitive both (i) to the amount of evidence
in support of ϕ, and (ii) to the ratio of evidence in support of ϕ to the total
amount of evidence in support of either ϕ or its negation. The notion of “amount
of evidence” is reminiscient of Keynes’s well-known concept of “weight of argu-
ment”, as clearly defined in the following paragraph from the famous treatise on
probability:
“...As the relevant evidence at our disposal increases, the magnitude of
the probability of the argument may either decrease or increase, accord-
ing as the new knowledge strengthens the unfavourable or the favourable
evidence; but something seems to have increased in either case, - we have
more substantial basis upon which to rest our conclusion. I express this by
saying that an accession of new evidence increases the weight of argument”
[25, p. 77].
The present work is mainly theoretical but, we believe, it can offer interesting
insights for people working on multi-agent system (MAS) applications in which
agents are supposed to be artificial entities such as a robot, a chatbot or a
conversational agent interacting with a human user. Such agents may be endowed
with the capability of forming beliefs on the basis of the collected evidence.
By way of example, consider a chatbot similar to Apple’s Siri or Microsoft’s
Cortana connected to the Internet who has to provide information to the human
user about the quality of a certain movie. In particular, the human user wants to
know whether a certain movie is good or bad. The chatbot has access to different
recommendation systems about movies in the Internet which are more or less
reliable (e.g., Netflix, Rotten Tomatoes, IMDb). The chatbot will form the belief
that the movie is good and inform the human user about this, depending on the
evidence it possesses in support of this fact.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we present the syntax and seman-
tics of the logic DL-BET and discuss some of its general properties. The seman-
tics of DL-BET combines a relational semantics for the concepts of knowledge
and belief and a neighbourhood semantics for the concept of evidence. A sound
and complete axiomatization for the logic is given in Sect. 3. The completeness
proof is non-standard, given the interrelation between the concepts of belief and
knowledge, on the one hand, and the concepts of trust and evidence, on the other
hand. In Sect. 4 we discuss related work. Finally, in Sect. 5 we conclude.
2 Dynamic Logic of Belief, Evidence and Trust
In this section, we present the syntax and the semantics of the logic DL-BET
and illustrate it on a concrete example.
The static component of DL-BET is called L-BET, which includes modal
operators for beliefs, knowledge, trust and evidence sources plus special atomic
formulas that allow us to represent an agent’s disposition to form beliefs based
on evidence, namely, how much evidence she needs to collect in support of a
fact in order to have a sufficient reason to believe that the fact is true. DL-BET
extends L-BET with four kinds of dynamic operators describing, respectively, (i)
the consequences of an agent’s public announcement, (ii) the consequences of
an agent’s mental operation of losing trust, (iii) the consequences of an agent’s
mental operation of relying on someone’s judgment, and (iv) the consequences
of an agent’s mental operation of assessing whether a certain fact is true or false.
On the technical side, DL-BET combine methods from Dynamic Epistemic
Logic (DEL) that has been developed in the past decades (cf. [5,9,16]), with
those techniques from neighbourhood semantics for modal logic (cf. [12]).
2.1 Syntax
Assume a non-empty countable set of atomic propositions Atm = {p, q, . . .} and
a non-empty finite set of agent names Agt = {i1, . . . , in}. Elements of 2
Agt are
called groups (or coalitions) and are denoted by J, J ′, . . . For every J ∈ 2Agt , |J |
denotes the cardinality of J .
The language of DL-BET, denoted by LDL−BET, is defined by the following
grammar in Backus-Naur Form (BNF):
α ::= !iϕ | −i,jϕ | +i,jϕ |?iϕ
ϕ ::= p | type(i, x, y) | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Kiϕ | Biϕ | Ei,jϕ | Ti,jϕ | [α]ϕ
where p ranges over Atm, i, j range over Agt , x ranges over Evd = {k ∈ N : 0 ≤
k ≤ card(Agt)} and y ranges over a finite chainQt ⊆ [12 , 1] such that 1 ∈ Qt . Sets
Evd and Qt are, respectively, the set of possible numbers of collected evidence
and the set of quota values. Evd and Qt are finite because an agent can have a
number of different evidence in support of a given fact which is at most equal to
the size of Agt .
The other Boolean constructions ⊤, ⊥, ∨, → and ↔ are defined from p, ¬
and ∧ in the standard way.
The language of L-BET (Logic of Belief, Evidence and Trust), denoted by
LL−BET, is defined by:
ϕ ::= p | type(i, x, y) | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Kiϕ | Biϕ | Ei,jϕ | Ti,jϕ
Ki is the standard modal operator of knowledge and Kiϕ has to be read
“agent i knows that ϕ is true”. Biϕ has to be read “agent i believes that ϕ is
true”. The dual of the knowledge operator and the dual of the belief operator
are defined as follows: K̂iϕ
def
= ¬Ki¬ϕ and B̂iϕ
def
= ¬Bi¬ϕ.
Ei,jϕ has to be read “agent i has evidence in support of ϕ based on the
information provided by agent j”.
Ti,jϕ has to be read “agent i trusts agent j’s judgement on ϕ”. Note that,
when i = j, the operator Ti,jϕ captures a notion of self-trust (or self-confidence).
As we mentioned earlier, since [27] similar modal operators for trust have been
studied by [14,31,33]. In this paper, following [27], we use a neighbourhood
semantics for interpreting the trust operators Ti,j because these modal opera-
tors are not normal. We want to allow situations in which, at the same time,
agent i trusts agent j’s judgement about ϕ and i trusts agent j’s judgement
about ¬ϕ, without inferring that i trusts agent j’s judgement about ⊥, that is,
we want formula Ti,jϕ ∧ Ti,j¬ϕ ∧ ¬Ti,j⊥ to be satisfiable. This means i has
potential to access j’s information some of which may support ϕ, some of which
may reject ϕ. For example, Bill may trust Mary’s judgement about the fact
that a certain stock will go upward (i.e., TBill,MarystockUp) and, at the same
time, trust Mary’s judgement about the fact that the stock will not go upward
(i.e., TBill,Mary¬stockUp), without trusting Mary’s judgement about ⊥ (i.e.,
TBill,Mary⊥).
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type(i, x, y) is a constant which characterizes agent i’s epistemic type. Specif-
ically, type(i, x, y) has to be read as “agent i has a level of epistemic cautiousness
equal to x and an acceptance quota equal to y”. Agent i’s acceptance quota cor-
responds to the ratio of evidence in support of a given fact to the total amount
of evidence in support of either the fact or its negation, that is required for the
agent to form the belief that the fact is true. A similar notion of quota is studied
in the area of judgment aggregation [15]. Agent i’s level of epistemic cautiousness
corresponds to the amount of evidence in support of a given fact that agent i
needs to collect before forming the belief that the fact is true. As we will show
below, an agent’s epistemic type characterizes the agent’s disposition to change
her beliefs on the basis of the evidence she collects.
We distinguish four types of events: !iϕ, −i,jϕ, +i,jϕ and ?iϕ. The symbol
!iϕ denotes the event of agent i publicly announcing that ϕ is true. −i,jϕ denotes
agent i’s mental operation of losing trust in agent j about ϕ, while the symbol
+i,jϕ denotes agent i’s mental operation of relying on agent j’s judgment about
ϕ. We assume that if an agent loses trust in someone or relies on someone,
then this fact is public (i.e., it is common knowledge that the agent has lost
trust in someone/has relied on someone’s judgment). Note that our logic clearly
distinguishes the concept of “trusting someone’s judgment”, denoted by formula
Ti,jϕ, from the concept of “relying on someone’s judgment”, denoted by events
+i,jϕ. The former is conceived as an agent’s mental attitude, while the latter is
conceived as an agent’s mental operation affecting her mental attitudes. Finally,
?iϕ denotes agent i’s mental operation assessing whether ϕ is true or false. As we
will show in Sect. 2.2, the latter mental operation has different possible outcomes,
depending on agent i’s epistemic state. In particular, agent i will be prone to
expand her set of beliefs by ϕ, if she does not believe the contrary and she has
sufficient reason to believe ϕ. She will revise her set of beliefs by ϕ, if she has
sufficient reason to believe ϕ and currently believes the contrary.
The formula [α]ϕ has to be read “ϕ will hold after the event α takes place”.
1 As we will show in Sect. 3, formula ¬Ti,j⊥ is valid in the logic DL-BET. Thus, if
Ti,j was a normal modal operator, ¬(Ti,jϕ ∧ Ti,j¬ϕ) would have been valid, which
is highly counter-intuitive.
Let us define the following abbreviations for every i ∈ Agt and x ∈ Evd :
E
≥x
i ϕ
def
=
∨
J∈2Agt :|J|=x
∧
j∈J
Ei,jϕ
Exi ϕ
def
= E≥xi ϕ ∧ ¬E
≥x+1
i ϕ
Riϕ
def
=
∨
x,x′,x′′∈Evd,y∈Qt:x>x′, x
x+x′
≥y and x≥x′′
(
Exi ϕ ∧ E
x′
i ¬ϕ ∧ type(i, x
′′, y)
)
We use the conventions E≥0i ϕ
def
= ⊤ and E
≥|Agt|+1
i ϕ
def
= ⊥.
E
≥x
i ϕ has to be read “agent i has at least x pieces of evidence in support
of ϕ”, whereas Exi ϕ has to be read “agent i has exactly x pieces of evidence in
support of ϕ”.
Riϕ has to be read “agent i has a sufficient reason to believe that ϕ is true”.
According to our definition, an agent has a sufficient reason to believe that ϕ is
true if and only if:
(i) she has more evidence in support of ϕ than evidence in support of ¬ϕ,
(ii) the ratio of evidence in support of ϕ to the total amount of evidence in
support of either ϕ or ¬ϕ, is equal to or above her acceptance quota,2
(iii) the amount of evidence in support of ϕ is equal to or above her threshold
of epistemic cautiousness.
As we will highlight in Sect. 2.2, a sufficient reason to believe that ϕ is true
ensures that the mental operation of assessing whether ϕ is true will result in
either the expansion or the revision of the agent’s set of beliefs by formula ϕ.
2.2 Semantics
The main notion in the semantics is given by the following definition of evidence
source model which provides the basic components for the interpretation of the
logic DL-BET:
Definition 1 (Evidence Source Model). An evidence source model (ESM)
is a tuple M = (W,E,D, S,C, T, V ) where:
– W is a set of worlds or situations;
– E : Agt −→ 2W×W s.t. for all i ∈ Agt, E(i) is an epistemic relation on W ;
– D : Agt −→ 2W×W s.t. for all i ∈ Agt, D(i) is a doxastic relation on W ;
– S : Agt ×Agt ×W −→ 22
W
is an evidence source function;
– C : Agt ×Agt ×W −→ 22
W
is a confidence function;
– T : Agt ×W −→ Evd ×Qt is an epistemic type function;
– V :W −→ 2Atm is a valuation function;
2 Note that this ratio can be conceived as the probability that ϕ is true, computed of
the basis of the number of evidence supporting ϕ.
and which satisfies the following conditions for all i, j ∈ Agt, for all w, v ∈ W
and for all X ⊆W :
(C1) E(i) is an equivalence relation;
(C2) D(i) is a serial relation;
(C3) D(i) ⊆ E(i);
(C4) if wE(i)v then D(i)(w) = D(i)(v);
(C5) if wE(i)v then S(i, j, w) = S(i, j, v);
(C6) if wE(i)v then C(i, j, w) = C(i, j, v);
(C7) if X ∈ C(i, j, v) then X ⊆ E(i)(w);
(C8) ∅ ∈ C(i, j, v);
(C9) if X ∈ S(i, j, v) then X ∈ C(i, j, v);
(C10) if wE(i)v then T (i, w) = T (i, v);
where, for any binary relation R on W , R(w) = {v ∈W : wRv}.
For notational convenience, we write Ei instead of E(i) and Di instead of D(i).
For every w ∈W , Ei(w) and Di(w) are called, respectively, agent i’s information
set and belief set at w. Agent i’s information set at w is the set of worlds that
agent i envisages at world w, while agent i’s belief set at w is the set of worlds
that agent i thinks to be possible at world w.
Constraint C1 ensures that the epistemic relation E(i) is nothing but the
indistinguishability relation traditionally used to model a fully introspective and
truthful notion of knowledge. Constraint C2 guarantees that an agent always
considers possible at least one world. This guarantees consistency of beliefs.
Constraint C3 ensures that the set of possible worlds is included in the set of
envisaged worlds. Indeed, following [26], a ESM requires that an agent is capable
of assessing whether an envisaged situation is possible or not.3
Constraint C4 just means that if two worlds are in the same information set
of agent i, then agent i has the same belief set at these two worlds. In other
words, an agent knows her beliefs.
It is worth noting that Constraints C1, C2, C3 and C4 together imply that
every relation Di is transitive and Euclidean.
S(i, j, w) is the set of evidence that agent j has provided to agent i where,
following [10], a piece of evidence is identified with a set of worlds. Constraint C5
means that if two worlds are in the same information set of agent i, then agent i
has the same evidence at these two worlds. In other words, an agent knows her
evidence.
The confidence function C specifies an agent’s trust in the judgments of
other agents. In particular, since each set of possible worlds X is the semantic
counterpart of a formula, the meaning of X ∈ C(i, j, w) is that, at world w,
agent i trusts agent j’s judgment on the truth of the formula corresponding to
3 Here we take the term “envisaged” to be synonymous of the term “imagined”.
Clearly, there are situations that one can imagine that she considers impossible. For
example, a person can imagine a situation in which she is the president of French
republic and, at the same time, considers this situation impossible.
X. Constraint C6 means that if two worlds are in the same information set of
agent i, then agent i has the same trust at these two worlds. This corresponds to
a property of positive introspection for trust, i.e., an agent knows whether she
trusts someone.
Constraint C7 captures compatibility between knowledge and trust. Specifi-
cally, according to Constraint C7, an agent can trust someone only about facts
which are compatible with her current information set. According to Constraint
C8, an agent cannot trust someone about inconsistent facts.
Constraint C9 captures the basic relationship between evidence and trust:
an agent i cannot receive a piece of evidence from another agent j, unless agent
i trusts agent j’s judgement. In other words, trust in the source is a necessary
condition for making the information provided by the source a piece of evidence.
It is worth noting that Constraints C7 and C9 together imply that an agent can
have evidence only about facts which are compatible with her current informa-
tion set, while Constraints C8 and C9 together imply that an agent cannot have
evidence about inconsistent facts, that is:
– if X ∈ S(i, j, v) then X ⊆ E(i)(w), and
– ∅ ∈ S(i, j, v).
T (i, w) corresponds to agent i’s epistemic type at world w. Constraint C10
just means that if two worlds are in the same information set of agent i, then
agent i has the same epistemic type at these two worlds. In other words, an
agent knows her epistemic type. As emphasized above, an agent’s epistemic
type is defined by the agent’s level of epistemic cautiousness and the agent’s
acceptance quota.
Truth conditions of DL-BET formulas are inductively defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Truth conditions). Let M = (W,E,D, S,C, T, V ) be a ESM
and let w ∈W . Then:
M,w |= p⇐⇒ p ∈ V (w)
M,w |= type(i, x, y)⇐⇒ T (i, w) = (x, y)
M,w |= ¬ϕ⇐⇒M,w |= ϕ
M,w |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ψ
M,w |= Kiϕ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ Ei(w) :M,v |= ϕ
M,w |= Biϕ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ Di(w) :M,v |= ϕ
M,w |= Ei,jϕ⇐⇒ ||ϕ||
M
i,w ∈ S(i, j, w)
M,w |= Ti,jϕ⇐⇒ ||ϕ||
M
i,w ∈ C(i, j, w)
M,w |= [α]ψ ⇐⇒Mα, w |= ψ
where
||ϕ||Mi,w = {v ∈W :M,v |= ϕ} ∩ Ei(w),
M !iϕ, M−i,jϕ, M+i,jϕ and M?iϕ are updated models defined according to the
following Definitions 3, 4, 5 and 6.
According to the truth conditions: agent i knows that ϕ at world w if and
only if ϕ is true in all worlds that at w agent i envisages, and agent i believes
that ϕ at world w if and only if ϕ is true in all worlds that at w agent i considers
possible. Moreover, at world w agent j has provided evidence in support of ϕ to
agent i if and only if, at w, agent i has the fact corresponding to the formula ϕ
(i.e., ||ϕ||Mi,w) included in her evidence set S(i, j, w). Finally, at world w agent i
trusts agent j’s judgment about ϕ if and only if, at w, the fact corresponding
to the formula ϕ (i.e., ||ϕ||Mi,w) is included in agent i’s confidence set C(i, j, w).
In what follows, we define the updated models triggered by the four kinds of
events:
Definition 3 (Update via !iϕ). Let M = (W,E,D, S,C, T, V ) be a ESM.
Then, M !iϕ is the tuple (W,E,D, S!iϕ, C, T, V ) such that, for all j, k ∈ Agt and
w ∈W :
S!iϕ(j, k, w) =
{
S(j, k, w) ∪ {||ϕ||Mj,w} if k = i and M,w |= Tj,iϕ
S(j, k, w) otherwise
Definition 4 (Update via −i,jϕ). Let M = (W,E,D, S,C, T, V ) be a ESM.
Then, M−i,jϕ is the tuple (W,E,D, S−i,jϕ, C−i,jϕ, T, V ) such that, for all k, l ∈
Agt and w ∈W :
S−i,jϕ(k, l, w) =
{
S(k, l, w) \ {||ϕ||Mk,w} if k = i and l = j
S(k, l, w) otherwise
C−i,jϕ(k, l, w) =
{
C(k, l, w) \ {||ϕ||Mk,w} if k = i and l = j
C(k, l, w) otherwise
Definition 5 (Update via +i,jϕ). Let M = (W,E,D, S,C, T, V ) be a ESM.
Then, M+i,jϕ is the tuple (W,E,D, S,C+i,jϕ, T, V ) such that, for all k, l ∈ Agt
and w ∈W :
C+i,jϕ(k, l, w) =
{
C(k, l, w) ∪ {||ϕ||Mk,w} if k = i and l = j and M,w |= K̂iϕ
C(k, l, w) otherwise
Definition 6 (Update via ?iϕ). Let M = (W,E,D, S,C, T, V ) be a ESM.
Then, M?iϕ is the tuple (W,E,D?iϕ, S, C, T, V ) such that, for all j ∈ Agt and
w ∈W :
D?iϕj (w) =

Dj(w) ∩ ||ϕ||
M
j,w if j = i and M,w |= Riϕ ∧ ¬Bi¬ϕ
Dj(w) ∩ ||¬ϕ||
M
j,w if j = i and M,w |= Ri¬ϕ ∧ ¬Biϕ
||ϕ||Mj,w if j = i and M,w |= Riϕ ∧ Bi¬ϕ
||¬ϕ||Mj,w if j = i and M,w |= Ri¬ϕ ∧ Biϕ
Dj(w) otherwise
As highlighted by Definition 3, if an agent announces that ϕ is true, then she
will provide a piece of new evidence in support of ϕ only to the agents who trust
her judgement about ϕ.
According to Definition 4, if an agent i loses trust in someone about a given
fact, then this fact is removed from the set of facts for which i trusts j’s judgment.
To ensure that Constraint C9 in Definition 1 is preserved under this model update
operation, the fact is also removed from the set of evidence provided by agent j
to agent i.
Acccording to Definition 5, if agent i relies on agent j’s judgment about a
certain fact then, as a consequence, this fact is added to the set of facts for
which i trusts j’s judgment, under the condition that the fact is consistent with
i’s knowledge. The latter condition guarantees that Constraint C8 in Definition 1
is preserved under this model update operation.
According to Definition 6, the mental operation of assessing whether ϕ is true
has five possible outcomes:
– if an agent has a sufficient reason to believe that ϕ is true and does not believe
that ϕ is false, then she expands her beliefs by removing from her belief set
the worlds in which ϕ is false,
– if an agent has a sufficient reason to believe that ϕ is false and does not believe
that ϕ is true, then she expands her beliefs by removing from her belief set
the worlds in which ϕ is true,
– if an agent has a sufficient reason to believe that ϕ is true and actually believes
that ϕ is false, then she revises her beliefs by removing from her belief set
the worlds in which ϕ is false and including all worlds of her information set
in which ϕ is true,
– if an agent has a sufficient reason to believe that ϕ is false and actually believes
that ϕ is true, then she revises her beliefs by removing from her belief set the
worlds in which ϕ is true and including all worlds of her information set in
which ϕ is false,
– if an agent has no sufficient reason to believe that ϕ is true and has no
sufficient reason to believe that ϕ is false, then she suspends her judgement
about ϕ and does not change her belief set.
This highlights the distinction between expansion, revision and suspension
of judgement. Since [1], the former two mental operations have been exten-
sively studied in the area of belief revision. While expansion captures the idea
of increasing the set of facts that an agent believes, revision captures the idea of
restoring consistency, after having added to the set of beliefs a new information
that is inconsistent with the pre-existing information. The latter mental oper-
ation has been studied in the epistemological area (see, e.g., [20]). It captures
the idea that an agent is not willing to integrate a new information in her set of
beliefs, unless she has gathered enough evidence in support of it.
As the following proposition highlights, our model update operations are
well-defined as they preserve the properties of evidence source models (ESMs)
as defined in Definition 1.
Proposition 1. IfM is a ESM thenM !iϕ,M−i,jϕ,M+i,jϕ andM?iϕ are ESMs
too.
For every ϕ ∈ LDL−BET, we write |= ϕ to mean that ϕ is valid w.r.t. the class
of ESMs, that is, for every M = (W,E,D, S,C, T, V ) and for every w ∈ W we
have M,w |= ϕ. We say that ϕ is satisfiable w.r.t. the class of ESMs if and only
if ¬ϕ is not valid w.r.t. the class of ESMs.
2.3 Some Properties
In this section we focus on some basic properties of the logic DL-BET. We start
with the following static properties of evidence, trust and reason:
|= Ti,jϕ→ K̂iϕ (1)
|= Ei,jϕ→ K̂iϕ (2)
|= Riϕ→ K̂iϕ (3)
|= ¬(Riϕ ∧ Ri¬ϕ) (4)
According to the validities (1), (2) and (3), trust, evidence and reason are always
consistent with knowledge. The validity (4) highlights that an agent cannot have
inconsistent reasons.
Let us now consider some dynamic properties that only apply to the propo-
sitional fragment of the logic DL-BET. Let LAtm be the propositional language
build out of the set of atoms Atm. Then, for ϕ,ψ ∈ LAtm we have:
|= Ti,jϕ→ [!jϕ]Ei,jϕ (5)
|= [−i,jϕ](¬Ei,jϕ ∧ ¬Ti,jϕ) (6)
|= K̂iϕ→ [+i,jϕ]Ti,jϕ (7)
|= Riϕ→ [?iϕ]Biϕ (8)
|= Ri¬ϕ→ [?iϕ]Bi¬ϕ (9)
|=
(
(Riϕ ∧ Ki(ϕ→ ψ)) ∨ (Ri¬ϕ ∧ Ki(¬ϕ→ ψ))
)
→ [?iϕ]Biψ (10)
|=
(
(Riϕ ∧ ¬Bi¬ϕ ∧ Biψ) ∨ (Ri¬ϕ ∧ ¬Biϕ ∧ Biψ)
)
→ [?iϕ]Biψ (11)
According to the validity (5), if an agent trusts the information source’s judgment
about ϕ, then she will have an additional evidence in support of ϕ after the
information source has publicly announced that ϕ is true. Validities (6) and (7)
highlight the basic properties of the mental operation of losing trust in someone’s
judgment and relying on someone’s judgment. Specifically, after having lost trust
in agent j’s judgment about ϕ, i does not trust anymore j’s judgment about
ϕ and j cannot provide any more evidence in support of ϕ. Moreover, if ϕ
is consistent with agent i’s knowledge then, after having relied on agent j’s
judgment about ϕ, i does trusts j’s judgment about ϕ. Validities (8) and (9)
highlight the role of reason in the formation of belief: if agent i has a sufficient
reason to believe ϕ/¬ϕ then, after having assessed whether ϕ is true, she will
start to believe ϕ/¬ϕ. Validity (10) highlights the role of knowledge in reason-
based belief change: if an agent has a sufficient reason to believe ϕ/¬ϕ and knows
that ϕ/¬ϕ implies ψ then, after having assessed whether ϕ is true, she will start
to believe ψ. Validity (11) highlights the conservative aspect of reason-based
belief expansion: if an agent has a sufficient reason to believe ϕ/¬ϕ without
believing the contrary and believes ψ then, after having assessed whether ϕ is
true, she will continue to believe ψ.
The reason why we need to impose that ϕ and ψ are propositional formulas
is that there are DL-BET-formulas such as the Moore-like formula p ∧ ¬Bip for
which the previous validities (5)–(11) do not hold. For instance, the following
formula is not valid:
Ri(p ∧ ¬Bip)→ [?i(p ∧ ¬Bip)]Bi(p ∧ ¬Bip).
This is intuitive since if I have sufficient reason to believe that my uncertainty
about p could be unjustified then, after assessing whether this is the case, I may
start to believe that p and that I believe this (since I have introspection over my
beliefs).
2.4 An Example
This section is devoted to illustrate the syntax and the semantics of the logic
DL-BET with the aid of a concrete example of AI application.
Suppose a human user wants to know whether the movie The Tree of Life by
Terrence Malick is a great movie or not and asks this to her chatbot. The chabot
has access to four information sources in the Internet, namely, Wikipedia, IMDb,
Amazon and Rotten Tomatoes (RT). The chatbot knows that if “The Tree of
Life has won the Palm d’Or at the Cannes festival”, denoted by proposition p,
then “The Tree of Life is a great movie”, denoted by proposition q:
Hyp1
def
= Kchatbot(p→ q)
Moreover, the chatbot trusts the judgments of both RT and Amazon about q
and ¬q. This means that if either RT or Amazon says that The Tree of Life is
a great movie/is not a great movive, then this counts as a piece of evidence in
support of this fact. Finally, the chatbot trusts the judgments of both Wikipedia
and IMDb about p and ¬p:
Hyp2
def
= Tchatbot,Wikipediap ∧ Tchatbot,IMDbp∧
Tchatbot,Wikipedia¬p ∧ Tchatbot,IMDb¬p∧
Tchatbot,RT q ∧ Tchatbot,Amazonq∧
Tchatbot,RT¬q ∧ Tchatbot,Amazon¬q
Moreover, suppose that the chatbot (i) is uncertain whether p is true and is
uncertain whether q is true, (ii) has no evidence in support of p,¬p, q and ¬q,
and (iii) has a level of epistemic cautiousness equal to 2 and an acceptance quota
equal to 1. That is:
Hyp3
def
= ¬Bchatbotp ∧ ¬Bchatbot¬p ∧ ¬Bchatbotq ∧ ¬Bchatbot¬q∧
E0chatbotp ∧ E
0
chatbot¬p ∧ E
0
chatbotq ∧ E
0
chatbot¬q ∧ type(chatbot, 2, 1)
Thus, if the chatbot learns from Amazon that The Tree of Life is a great
movie while it learns from RT that The Tree of Life is not a great movie, it will
be unable to draw any conclusion about the fact that The Tree of Life is a great
movie and keep its initial uncertainty. That is:
|= (Hyp1 ∧Hyp2 ∧Hyp3 )→| [!Amazonq][!RT¬q][?chatbotq](¬Bchatbotq ∧ ¬Bchatbot¬q)
On the contrary, if the chatbot learns both from Wikipedia and from IMDb that
The Tree of Life has won the Palm d’Or at the Cannes festival, then it will be
able to infer that The Tree of Life is a great movie. That is:
|= (Hyp1 ∧Hyp2 ∧Hyp3 )→ [!Wikipediap][!IMDbp][?chatbotp]Bchatbotq
3 Axiomatization
Let us now present sound and complete axiomatizations for the logic L-BET
and its dynamic extension DL-BET. The completeness proof of L-BET is based
on a canonical model construction.4 All axioms of L-BET, except two, are used
in the usual way to prove that the canonical model so constructed is a ESM.
There are two special axioms of the logic L-BET, about the interrelation between
knowledge and trust and between knowledge and evidence that are used in an
unusual way to prove the truth lemma.
Definition 7 (L-BET). We define L-BET to be the extension of classical propo-
sitional logic given by the following rules and axioms:
4 The proof can be found in the extended version of this paper [28].
(Kiϕ ∧ Ki(ϕ→ ψ))→ Kiψ (KKi)
Kiϕ→ ϕ (TKi)
Kiϕ→ KiKiϕ (4Ki)
¬Kiϕ→ Ki¬Kiϕ (5Ki)
(Biϕ ∧ Bi(ϕ→ ψ))→ Biψ (KBi)
¬(Biϕ ∧ Bi¬ϕ) (DBi)
¬Ti,j⊥ (ConsTi,j )∨
x∈Evd,y∈Qt
type(i, x, y) (AtLeasttype(i,x,y))
type(i, x, y)→ ¬type(i, x′, y′) if x = x′ or y = y′ (AtMosttype(i,x,y))
Kiϕ→ Biϕ (Mix1Ki,Bi)
Biϕ→ KiBiϕ (Mix2Ki,Bi)
type(i, x, y)→ Kitype(i, x, y) (MixKi,type(i,x,y))
Ei,jϕ→ Ti,jϕ (MixEi,j ,Ti,j )
Ei,jϕ→ KiEi,jϕ (Mix1Ki,Ei,j )
Ti,jϕ→ KiTi,jϕ (Mix1Ki,Ti,j )
(Ti,jϕ ∧ Ki(ϕ↔ ψ))→ Ti,jψ (Mix2Ki,Ti,j )
(Ei,jϕ ∧ Ki(ϕ↔ ψ))→ Ei,jψ (Mix2Ki,Ei,j )
ϕ
Kiϕ
(NecKi)
Note that the rule of necessitation for Bi is provable by (NecKi) and
(Mix1Ki,Bi). Moreover, Axiom 4 for Bi is provable by (Mix1Ki,Bi) and
(Mix2Ki,Bi). Axiom 5 for Bi is provable by means of (Mix1Ki,Bi), (Mix2Ki,Bi),
KKi , TKi , 4Ki and 5Ki . A syntactic proof can be found in [30]. Finally, the
following rules of equivalence for trust and evidence are provable by means of
(NecKi), (Mix2Ki,Ti,j ) and (Mix2Ki,Ei,j ):
ϕ↔ ψ
Ti,jϕ↔ Ti,jψ
(12)
ϕ↔ ψ
Ei,jϕ↔ Ei,jψ
(13)
Theorem 1. The logic L-BET is sound and complete for the class of ESMs.
The axiomatics of the logic DL-BET includes all principles of the logic L-BET
plus a set of reduction axioms and the rule of replacement of equivalents.
Definition 8. We define DL-BET to be the extension of L-BET generated by the
following reduction axioms for the dynamic operators [!iϕ]:
[!iϕ]p↔p (Red!iϕ,p)
[!iϕ]type(k, x, y)↔type(k, x, y) (Red!iϕ,type(l,x,y))
[!iϕ]¬ψ ↔¬[!iϕ]ψ (Red!iϕ,¬)
[!iϕ](ψ ∧ χ)↔([!iϕ]ψ ∧ [!iϕ]χ) (Red!iϕ,∧)
[!iϕ]Kjψ ↔Kj [!iϕ]ψ (Red!iϕ,Kj )
[!iϕ]Bjψ ↔Bj [!iϕ]ψ (Red!iϕ,Bj )
[!iϕ]Ej,kψ ↔Ej,k[!iϕ]ψ if i = k (Red!iϕ,Ej,k)
[!iϕ]Ej,iψ ↔
((
Tj,iϕ→ (Ej,i[!iϕ]ψ ∨ Kj(ϕ↔ [!iϕ]ψ))
)
∧(
¬Tj,iϕ→ Ej,i[!iϕ]ψ
))
(Red!iϕ,Ej,i)
[!iϕ]Tj,kψ ↔Tj,k[!iϕ]ψ (Red!iϕ,Tj,k)
the following ones for the dynamic operators [−i,jϕ]:
[−i,jϕ]p↔p (Red−i,jϕ,p)
[−i,jϕ]type(k, x, y)↔type(k, x, y) (Red−i,jϕ,type(l,x,y))
[−i,jϕ]¬ψ ↔¬[−i,jϕ]ψ (Red−i,jϕ,¬)
[−i,jϕ](ψ ∧ χ)↔([−i,jϕ]ψ ∧ [−i,jϕ]χ) (Red−i,jϕ,∧)
[−i,jϕ]Kkψ ↔Kk[−i,jϕ]ψ (Red−i,jϕ,Kk)
[−i,jϕ]Bkψ ↔Bk[−i,jϕ]ψ (Red−i,jϕ,Bk)
[−i,jϕ]Ek,lψ ↔Ek,l[−i,jϕ]ψ if i = k or j = l (Red−i,jϕ,Ek,l)
[−i,jϕ]Ei,jψ ↔
(
Ei,j [−i,jϕ]ψ ∨ ¬Ki(ϕ↔ [−i,jϕ]ψ)
)
(Red−i,jϕ,Ei,j )
[−i,jϕ]Tk,lψ ↔Tk,l[−i,jϕ]ψ if i = k or j = l (Red−i,jϕ,Tk,l)
[−i,jϕ]Ti,jψ ↔
(
Ti,j [−i,jϕ]ψ ∨ ¬Ki(ϕ↔ [−i,jϕ]ψ)
)
(Red−i,jϕ,Ti,j )
the following ones for the dynamic operators [+i,jϕ]:
[+i,jϕ]p↔p (Red+i,jϕ,p)
[+i,jϕ]type(k, x, y)↔type(k, x, y) (Red+i,jϕ,type(l,x,y))
[+i,jϕ]¬ψ ↔¬[+i,jϕ]ψ (Red+i,jϕ,¬)
[+i,jϕ](ψ ∧ χ)↔([+i,jϕ]ψ ∧ [+i,jϕ]χ) (Red+i,jϕ,∧)
[+i,jϕ]Kkψ ↔Kk[+i,jϕ]ψ (Red+i,jϕ,Kk)
[+i,jϕ]Bkψ ↔Bk[+i,jϕ]ψ (Red+i,jϕ,Bk)
[+i,jϕ]Ek,lψ ↔Ek,l[+i,jϕ]ψ (Red+i,jϕ,Ek,l)
[+i,jϕ]Tk,lψ ↔Tk,l[+i,jϕ]ψ if i = k or j = l (Red+i,jϕ,Tk,l)
[+i,jϕ]Ti,jψ ↔
((
K̂iϕ→ (Ti,j [+i,jϕ]ψ ∨ Ki(ϕ↔ [+i,jϕ]ψ))
)
∧(
Ki¬ϕ→ Ti,j [+i,jϕ]ψ
))
(Red+i,jϕ,Ti,j )
the following ones for the dynamic operators [?iϕ]:
[?iϕ]p↔p (Red?iϕ,p)
[?iϕ]type(k, x, y)↔type(k, x, y) (Red?iϕ,type(l,x,y))
[?iϕ]¬ψ ↔¬[?iϕ]ψ (Red?iϕ,¬)
[?iϕ](ψ ∧ χ)↔([?iϕ]ψ ∧ [?iϕ]χ) (Red?iϕ,∧)
[?iϕ]Kjψ ↔Kj [?iϕ]ψ (Red?iϕ,Kj )
[?iϕ]Bjψ ↔Bj [?iϕ]ψ if i = j (Red?iϕ,Bj )
[?iϕ]Biψ ↔
((
α1 → Bi(ϕ→ [?iϕ]ψ)
)
∧
(
α2 → Bi(¬ϕ→ [?iϕ]ψ)
)
∧(
α3 → Ki(ϕ→ [?iϕ]ψ)
)
∧
(
α4 → Ki(¬ϕ→ [?iϕ]ψ)
)
∧(
α5 → Bi[?iϕ]ψ
))
(Red?iϕ,Bi)
[?iϕ]Ej,kψ ↔Ej,k[?iϕ]ψ (Red?iϕ,Ej,k)
[?iϕ]Ej,kψ ↔Ej,k[?iϕ]ψ (Red?iϕ,Ej,k)
[?iϕ]Tj,kψ ↔Tj,k[?iϕ]ψ (Red?iϕ,Tj,k)
and the following rule of inference:
ψ1 ↔ ψ2
ϕ↔ ϕ[ψ1/ψ2]
(RRE)
with:
α1
def
= Riϕ ∧ ¬Bi¬ϕ
α2
def
= Ri¬ϕ ∧ ¬Biϕ
α3
def
= Riϕ ∧ Bi¬ϕ
α4
def
= Ri¬ϕ ∧ Biϕ
α5
def
= ¬α1 ∧ ¬α2 ∧ ¬α3 ∧ ¬α4
The completeness of DL-BET follows from Theorem1, in view of the fact that
the reduction axioms and the rule (RRE) may be used to find, for any DL-BET
formula, a provably equivalent L-BET formula.
Theorem 2. DL-BET is sound and complete for the class of ESMs.
4 Related Work
Artemov [2] proposes so-called justification logic in which evidence is expressed
as a term, and possible manipulations of evidence are operations over terms. This
framework has been further connected to the notion of explicit and implicit
beliefs and belief revision in [6]. Differently, [10,11] adopts a neighbourhood
semantics, adding evidence to the standard belief model in the form of fami-
lies of sets of possible worlds, and studies evidence-based belief change. These
approaches share with DL-BET the idea of modeling the relationship between
evidence and belief.
Social influence in terms of individual’s belief change has caught a lot of
attention in recent years. Liu, Seligman and Girard [29] proposes a finite state
automata model with a threshold to deal with social influence. As a simple case,
agent i would change her belief from p to ¬p if all her neighbors believe ¬p. This
model can successfully explain social phenomena, like peer pressure, and behav-
ior adoption. Christoff [13] further develops this model and investigates various
features of social networks and their evolution over time, including information
flow and spread of opinions. Xue and Parikh [34] looks at expert influence in
social network, and show how an agent makes decisions when facing conflict-
ing choices in belief update. These approaches share with DL-BET the idea of
modeling belief change and belief formation due to the information received by,
possibly conflicting, information sources.
When considering the relationship between agents in the context of infor-
mation exchange, trust is the core notion in play. Early work [27] studies the
influence of trust on agent’s formation of beliefs with an axiom saying that if
agent i believes that agent j has told her the truth about p, and she trusts the
judgement of j about p, then she will also believe p. In the context of social
influence, [4] introduces quantitative measurement on trust between agents and
strength of evidence, and stipulates how these parameters influence one’s valu-
ation of new evidence. Lorini, Jiang and Perrussel [31] studies the phenomenon
of trust-based belief change, that is, belief change that depends on the degree
of trust the receiver has in the source of information. In a similar way, in [22]
trust is conceived as a pre-processing step before belief revision. Viewed in line
of social choice theory, one can also think of belief formation or change as a
process of aggregating opinions from different reliable information sources, as in
[21]. These approaches share with DL-BET the idea that trust in the information
source plays a fundamental role in belief change and belief formation.
In the area of information fusion, a similar concern on belief, evidence and
trust has led to number of proposals [18,23,24,32]. However, these approaches
lean heavily on the machinery of Bayesian probability theory. For instance, in
so-called subjective logic, based on the Dempster-Shafer rule, Jøsang proposes
a new Bayesian update function to study belief revision. In contrast, our main
concern with DL-BET is the logical relationship between notions of knowledge,
belief, evidence and trust, as well as the principles of reasoning about them, thus
our work is qualitative in nature.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a new logic, called “Dynamic Logic of Belief,
Evidence and Trust” (DL-BET), which supports reasoning about evidence-based
belief formation and belief change in a multi-agent setting. We have provided a
complete axiomatization for both the static L-BET and its dynamic extension
DL-BET. We have illustrated the expressive power of DL-BET with the aid of a
concrete example involving a chatbot interacting with a human.
The logical account of belief revision we have provided (Definition 6) is rad-
ical: if an agent has a sufficient reason to believe a certain fact ϕ and currently
believes the opposite then, after assessing whether ϕ is true, she will include in
her belief set all worlds of her information set in which ϕ is true. In future work,
we plan to extend the formal semantics of the logic DL-BET by a plausibility
ordering over possible words for each agent, as traditionally used in modal logic
analysis of belief revision (see, e.g., [7,8]). This extension will allow us to refine
the belief revision operation by assuming that, after a revision by ϕ, an agent
will include in her belief set only the best worlds (according to the plausibility
ordering) of her information set in which ϕ is true.
We have emphasized that the epistemic cautiousness level and acceptance
quota specify together how much evidence one needs to collect to form a belief,
or change one’s belief. Though our framework has worked with numerals already,
we have managed to get a complete logic. In future work we would like to extend
our model to handle uncertainties in evidence and belief as well as with degrees
of trust or graded trust in information sources. It is our intention to explore how
far we can go with such a still qualitative-oriented approach against a completely
quantitative method.
Finally, an agent obtains information from trusted sources by social commu-
nication, and forms her beliefs on the basis of reasons. In this paper, we have
investigated epistemic reasons. We plan to extend our logical framework with
agents’ goal and preferences in order to incorporate practical reasons in our
analysis and to study their connection with epistemic reasons. This may also
bring us closer to the cognitive trust model [19] where sentences like “i trusts j
to do α in order to achieve ϕ” are dealt with.
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